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Pharmaceuticals and Food Safety 
 
Executive Summary 
In this submission, we demonstrate how public health in Australia could be adversely affected 
by the adoption of the proposed Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement (AUSFTA). 
We focus on two key areas important to public health.  Firstly, we examine the problems with 
linking Australias Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme (PBS) to trade under the AUSFTA.  We 
use a scenario of a future dispute over listing of a new pharmaceutical to highlight the 
potential for direct US impact on Australias capacity to provide good medicines at low cost.  
Secondly, we discuss the potential for the AUSFTA to lower Australias food safety 
standards.  We highlight problems with the interpretation of science-based risk assessment 
and describe how the AUSFTA  and the WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
(SPS) Measures more generally  has the capacity to weaken Australian quarantine practices, 
by increasing the pressure to harmonise downwards Australias food safety and agricultural 
standards.  We use the case of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) to illustrate the past 
effectiveness of Australias cautious approach to risk assessment. 
 
The Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme 
Despite Australian Government assurances that the cost of pharmaceuticals will not rise under 
the AUSFTA, mechanisms in the AUSFTA will lead to increases in the costs of essential 
medicines, and to diminished access to them.  
US Trade Representative Bob Zoellick did not dispute recent statements in a US Senate 
hearing that the AUSFTA would facilitate Australian consumers bearing a greater proportion 
of research and development (R&D) costs for US pharmaceuticals. Zoellick specifically 
suggested this might be achieved through the AUSFTAs express support for drug 
innovation and R&D, the activities of the new Medicines Working Group and a mechanism 
to review decisions not to list drugs on the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme (PBS).  These 
developments signal a shift towards commercialism in the principles under which the PBS 
operates.  After briefly summarising the history and purpose of the PBS, we discuss these 
mechanisms and their potential to erode the PBS. 
 
Principles and purpose of the PBS 
The PBS allows the Federal Government to set a Commonwealth Price as the basis of a 
subsidy to assist the supply of listed drugs from approved pharmacists on presentation of a 
prescription. At its inception in 1953, the life-saving drugs recommended to the Minister by 
Pharmaceutical Benefits Advisory Committee (PBAC) for listing must be decided on 
medical grounds alone.1 A 1987 amendment expressly allowed the PBAC to evaluate the 
comparative effectiveness and cost of drugs proposed for listing. The justification was that the 
                                                 
1 Minister Sir Earle Page, Second Reading Speech National Health Act 1953 (Cth).  
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 Commonwealth Government did not believe the taxpayer should foot the bill for very 
expensive drugs that offer only minimal advantages over cheaper alternatives.2  
The US is obligated under its Trade Promotion Authority Act (2000) US to ensure its trade 
agreements facilitate affordable access to essential medicines under the Doha Declaration 
of the convention on Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).  Yet, in the quest to 
make the Australian public pay more for US drugs, and if the trend of other bilateral 
negotiations in which it has been involved is repeated, the US may threaten to use various 
strategies under the AUSFTA to erode drug affordability criteria and the basic principles of 
egalitarian health care that underpin Australias PBS. 
 
The new PBAC review mechanism 
The current PBS review mechanism is through appeal to the Federal Court.  In a recent 
appeal, pharmaceutical manufacturers failed in challenging the PBACs decision not to 
recommend listing of the expensive drug Viagra, which offered no therapeutic advantage over 
existing treatments (Pfizer v Birkett in 2000).3 It is inevitable that their perceptions of what is 
achievable through any new review process for PBAC decisions will be coloured by this 
negative experience. 
The AUSFTA provides means for drug companies to strongly influence which drugs may be 
listed on the PBS, including a new review mechanism in Annex 2-C 2 (f) of the draft 
AUSFTA for drugs whose listing has not been recommended by the PBAC.  It appears likely 
that this process will be developed by a Medicines Working Group, which has no guaranteed 
influential representation by Australian consumers or Australian owned generic drug 
manufacturers.  To show the potential harmful effects of this new mechanism, we sketch a 
foreseeable future scenario. 
Assume in five years time, that a new US drug with large R&D costs has been advertised by 
Internet links from sites popular with Australian patients (as allowed by Annex 2-C5). Side 
letters in the AUSFTA between Mark Vaile and Robert Zoellick allow the US drug 
manufacturers to consult extensively with members of the PBAC as a new drug is being 
considered for listing, to lobby the PBAC and be given information facilitating an application 
to the Commonwealth price setting body. Further assume that despite using these 
opportunities, the drug is nonetheless rejected for PBS listing because the PBAC considers its 
expense is not matched by a substantial improvement in efficacy or reduction in toxicity over 
existing listed pharmaceuticals or treatments.  
The US now decides to threaten moving beyond any consultative process to a dispute 
resolution Panel. In this case the Panel is specially convened under the AUSFTA article 21.7, 
and will comprise three trade and intellectual property experts, chosen from a list of ten 
potential members. One expert panellist will be nominated by each party and one (the Chair) 
will be jointly agreed. This unelected body of three persons will have the power to interpret 
Australias compliance with obligations in the AUSFTA related to its PBS. This is a 
significant threat to Australias sovereignty in the public health area. 
Faced with determining whether the outcome of the review mechanism actually fulfils 
AUSFTA obligations, the Panel turns to the four interpretive principles set out at the 
                                                 
2 Minister Humphries, Second Reading Speech, 1987 amendments to National Health Act 1953 (Cth). 
3 Pfizer Pty Ltd v Birkett [2000] FCA 303 20 March 2003. 
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beginning of Annex 2-C. These principles are heavily weighted towards the agenda of the US 
pharmaceutical industry, emphasizing innovation, research and development and 
transparent, expeditious and accountable procedures as well as competitive markets. The 
important Australian principles of affordability and comparative efficacy are, in contrast, 
downplayed in 2-C 1 (c) and (d) and will need to be emphasized. Even in the sections dealing 
specifically with medicines, the AUSFTA positions trade as the central goal, while public 
health is merely peripheral.  
If Australia attempts to pass legislation that does not adequately comply with the AUSFTA, 
the US will initiate dispute proceedings. Another US strategy might be to threaten to use 
article 21.2 (c) which allows a damages claim where a benefit the US could reasonably have 
expected to accrue under Chapter 17 (Intellectual Property Rights) is being nullified or 
impaired as a result of a measure that is not inconsistent with this Agreement.  So even a 
breach of the spirit of the AUSFTA may be sufficient for retaliatory measures. 
The overall US threat is that if this dispute settlement Panel decides that Australia is in breach 
of its AUSFTA obligations or even the spirit of the agreement, then article 21.11 (2) permits a 
suspension of benefits or cross-retaliation in other trade areas such as beef, lamb, or 
manufacturing. In order to prevent this, the party found to be non-compliant can pay monetary 
compensation (article 21.11 (5). Ongoing failure to comply may permit the Panel to impose 
an annual monetary assessment (article 21. 12 (2)).  
Under the AUSFTA, PBAC decisions not to list innovative US drugs will have to be made 
in the shadow of threatened US trade retaliation. This pressure will be difficult to resist. It is 
imperative, therefore, that even, despite our strong contrary advice, if the AUSFTA is 
approved, strong legislative and administrative protections be immediately put in place to 
insulate the PBAC from such US threats to dismantle the price-restricting effects of 
Australias PBS. These could include amendments to the Therapeutic Goods Act, the 
National Health Act and the Patents Act to emphasise the unqualified importance of universal 
access to affordable medicines and the capacity to do experimental work for new 
pharmaceuticals without infringing existing patents. 
 
Quarantine and Food Safety 
Chapter Seven of the draft AUSFTA deals with Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Measures.  
It states that its purpose includes providing a forum for addressing bilateral SPS matters and 
resolving trade issues.  It explicitly states that it is intended to expand trade opportunities. 
This emphasis on expansion of trade to the greatest extent possible (7-4) will come at some 
cost to human health and agriculture, despite the stated objective that these should be 
protected.  The science-based risk assessment that is emphasised in the AUSFTA (and in the 
WTOs SPS Agreement more generally) is problematic, and allows no room for managing 
uncertainty.    
The AUSFTA recommits Australia to the WTOs SPS Agreement, and strengthens the 
position of the US if they consider Australia to be in breach of the Agreement.  This has 
serious implications for Australias ability to protect public health through import risk 
assessment and quarantine protocols. 
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Science-based risk assessment 
In the past, Australia has used the precautionary principle in its import risk assessments and 
quarantine responses.  In the absence of full scientific certainty of a risk, Australia has taken a 
cautious approach, which has served Australia very well in protecting public health and 
agriculture, including, for example, against bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), which 
is now distributed globally. 
Article 7.4 of the AUSFTA establishes a joint committee to promote the application of the 
WTOs SPS Agreement.  Under the SPS Agreement, the precautionary principle in import 
risk assessment can only be used to restrict imports for a matter of months, during which time 
the importing country is expected to carry out a scientific risk assessment that must address 
specific (i.e. known) risks, and in the case of agriculture, quantify the impact on industry and 
economy.   
However, specific risks are rarely certain.  For example, despite the theoretical (and in some 
cases established) risks involved in farming and consuming genetically modified (GM) 
produce, in the absence of specific known and quantifiable risks Australia will have to accept 
GM produce from the United States.  The same would be true for irradiated foods.  Irradiation 
reduces the nutritional value of foods, but the precise health risks remain unspecified.  The 
Australian government will not be able to protect public health pre-emptively, but will have to 
wait until people get sick and scientific data have been collected before it can act.  By that 
time, as with BSE elsewhere, the damage will already be done. 
The precautionary principle is well accepted across scientific disciplines, as an appropriate 
metric to inform decision making when risks are uncertain.  It is not accepted by the WTO as 
scientific, but is seen solely as a protectionist measure to safeguard domestic industry. 
 
Harmonising downwards 
Australia is under increasing pressure to harmonise its food standards with the international 
guidelines developed by the Codex Alimentarius Commission.  Although the Codex 
recommendations were intended to set minimum standards in food safety and were never 
meant to be a ceiling on the standards that any given country could set, they are increasingly 
used as such by the WTO (Silverglade and Heller 1997; Silverglade 1999).   
As Australias standards of food safety are frequently above the Codex recommendations, 
Australia is expected to lower its standards in the interests of trade liberalisation. 
The AUSFTA increases the pressure for downwards harmonisation of food safety and 
agricultural standards by recommitting Australia to a flawed interpretation of what science-
based means.  Australia will be expected to accept US imports where there is potential for 
risk but this risk cannot be quantified.   
Even when a risk has been quantified, import restrictions may still be removed following 
pressure from trading partners. For example, modelling conducted by CSIRO (commissioned 
by the Australian pork industry) put the likelihood of an exotic disease outbreak at between 
94 and 99 percent with new quarantine protocols that allow import of uncooked pork (ABC 
2004).   
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Although quarantine may not be directly named in the AUSFTA, it is nevertheless vulnerable 
to being undermined by the WTO dispute settlement process.  Australia has already been 
forced to accept imports that it was restricting on the basis of caution.  The WTO Dispute 
Settlement Body ruled in 1999 that Australia had to accept imports of fresh and frozen salmon 
(USTR 2000).  The import restrictions were deemed not to have been based on science in the 
absence of a quantitative risk assessment (Pauwelyn 1999).  In 2003, sea-lice were found 
under the skin of salmon imported into Australia from Norway (Green 2003).  Although not a 
threat to human health, sea-lice can kill salmon, and their presence poses a direct and serious 
threat to the lice-free status of the Australian industry (Green 2003). 
This example illustrates that pressure from trading partners, the system of dispute settlement 
under the WTO, and flawed interpretation of the SPS Agreement forced Australia to 
compromise its quarantine regulations; the result was introduction of a real threat to an 
Australian industry.  Despite the subsequent discovery of sea-lice in imported salmon and 
apparent justification of industry concerns, the salmon ruling has set a precedent for further 
challenges to Australian quarantine regulations. 
 
The case of BSE 
The BSE epidemic began in Britain in the 1980s as a result of feeding ruminant material to 
cattle.  International trade liberalisation has ensured that BSE is now geographically 
extremely widespread.  In December 2003, the United States reported its first confirmed case 
of BSE (AFFA 2003; AQIS 2003), while Australia is one of very few countries still free of 
BSE.   
Australia was protected from the epidemic through good agricultural practice and caution in 
import risk assessment.  Australia had already banned animal feed from Britain in 1966 
(Animal Health Australia 2000) over concerns about the sheep disease scrapie, two decades 
before specific dangers (i.e. BSE and variant CJD) of feeding ruminant material to other 
ruminants were known.  Under the SPS Agreement, and with the added weight from the 
AUSFTA, Australia today would not be able to take this precautionary action, and would be 
vulnerable to WTO-sanctioned retaliation by trading partners. 
Under international standards, animals declared unfit for human consumption may be used in 
animal feed provided there are adequate precautions to prevent misuse and to avoid dangers 
to human health and animal health (Codex Alimentarius Commission 1993, p.21).  That is, 
animals that are not deemed fit for human consumption can still end up as part of the human 
food system.  The failure to revise the standards suggests a failure to learn from mistakes.   
Codex recommends that inspection should be cost-effective (Codex Alimentarius 
Commission 1993).  If the risk for a particular disease or defect is low, then testing for it may 
not be cost-effective.  These recommendations therefore place industry interests above those 
of public health.  
In 2001, Australia banned the importation of beef products from 30 European countries after 
increased surveillance led to the identification of BSE affected animals (FSANZ 2001b) and 
the realisation that BSE was much more widespread than previously thought (FSANZ 2001a).  
Japan only detected its first case of BSE in 2001 when it introduced rigorous screening. That 
so many countries previously considered safe were reclassified as at risk for BSE highlights 
the importance of rigorous surveillance. 
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The testing regime in the United States has, in contrast, been described as extremely 
inadequate (The New York Times 2003), sampling only one in 1000 cattle slaughtered each 
year (Teather 2003), and most of these were staggering, disoriented or unable to walk 
(downers) (New Scientist 2003).     
The confirmed case of BSE in the United States may not be isolated.  Under the inspection 
regimes of most countries, only samples of those animals that appear ill may be sent for 
laboratory testing.  Test results from slaughtered at risk animals are available only after the 
meat and meat products have departed the slaughterhouse.  Before the confirmed case of BSE, 
some 20 000 downers were consumed each year in the United States (New Scientist 2003).  
The current United States testing regime does not prevent infected meat from entering the 
food chain (The New York Times 2003), but only allows products to be recalled.  The 
particular cow in the United States found to have BSE was declared fit for human 
consumption nearly two weeks before the test results were available, and would not normally 
have been tested except for an unrelated injury (Teather 2003).  Furthermore, two-thirds of 
the cattle that were imported from Canada with the infected cow could not be traced (United 
States Department of Agriculture 2004).   
Since the BSE case, the United States is expected to increase its testing almost ten-fold, to 
between 200 000 an 300 000 cattle annually, or up to one percent.  Ninety-nine out of every 
one hundred cattle would not be tested, even though the US is no longer BSE-free.  The 
president of the US Meat Export Federation, Philip Seng, recently stated that Japans call for 
the US to test all of its cattle was unscientific (US Office of the Scientific Liaison 2004).  
Since its own BSE scare in 2001, Japan now tests every cow intended for human 
consumption. 
The AUSFTA states that the regulatory systems and risk assessment processes of each party 
will be respected (7-4).  Even after its first case of BSE, the US has vastly inadequate testing 
regimes in place.  Respect for the USs regulatory systems will be misplaced, and could be 
detrimental to the health of Australians and the integrity of Australias agricultural industry.  
Australia will be expected to accept products that the United States considers safe, but which 
may fall short of current Australian standards.  Should Australia accept imports containing 
bovine material from a BSE-affected country where 99% of cattle are not tested? 
The risk that BSE posed was not known at the time that Australia invoked import bans on 
risky material, but its caution in restricting imports has since proven justified.  Such 
theoretical risk and the use of the precautionary principle is not allowed under the SPS 
Agreement, and is not permitted under the AUSFTA. 
Even now, international regulations may be too weak; much of the certification and regulation 
is based on industry self-regulation and report.  The BSE incident should serve as a warning; 
a practice that is internationally accepted can still be dangerous. 
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Protecting public health from the AUSFTA 
Both the PBS and quarantine are threatened by the AUSFTA.  In order to protect Australia 
from the public health dangers of the AUSFTA and any future trade agreements, the Senate 
should consider the following principles: 
1. The fundamental PBS principles of affordability and comparative efficacy that 
underpin Australias egalitarian health care should be strengthened.  Currently these 
are under-emphasised and under threat in the AUSFTA. 
2. The PBAC should be protected from pressure from the pharmaceutical industry.  If 
there is to be a Medicines Working Group, it must have guaranteed influential 
representation by Australian consumers and generic drug manufacturers. 
3. Strong legislative and administrative protections must be immediately put in place to 
insulate the PBAC from US threats to degrade the affordability of pharmaceuticals 
under the PBS. 
4. In the absence of absolute certainty, the precautionary principle is a valid, 
scientifically accepted approach to decision making.  It should be enshrined in the 
AUSFTA and accepted by the WTO.  The precautionary principle should be 
legitimate standard practice in risk assessment. 
5. The AUSFTA threatens Australias sovereignty over protecting the health of its 
population and its agricultural industry.  Australia should be able to maintain its high 
standards of food safety.  
6. Australia should not succumb to pressures to harmonise downwards its food and 
agriculture safety standards, but should instead be working to improve standards 
internationally.   
7. Politics have no place in deciding quarantine policies. 
8. Government has a responsibility to protect and promote the health of its people, 
regardless of short-term political considerations. 
 
These eight principles must be upheld to ensure continued access to affordable, quality 
medicines and a safe food supply for all Australians. 
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